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I. Introduction
The use of national security language to create and defend
immigration law and policy is historic.1 The Immigration and
 Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar and Clinical Professor of Law, Founding
Director, Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Penn State Law-University Park;
Author of BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN
IMMIGRATION CASES. The author thanks Peter Margulies and Fatma Marouf for their
feedback and is grateful to Casey Millburg and the editorial staff of the Washington
& Lee Law Review for their superb editorial assistance. The contents of this article
are drawn from and build upon remarks delivered on February 2 in connection with
the Lara D. Gass Symposium at Washington & Lee School of Law’s symposium:
President Trump's Executive Orders and Emergent Issues in Immigration; and
various blog posts on Medium https://medium.com/@shobawadhia and the American
Constitution Society, https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/all/shoba-sivaprasad-wadhia.
1. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A) (2012)
(discussing the national security needs in relation to immigration law, policies, and
procedures). For a look at how national security has been used to discuss immigration
control, see generally Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration
Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827 (2007);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law National Security Law?, 66 EMORY

1475

1476

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475 (2018)

Nationality Act (INA), which Congress enacted in 1952, contains
sections to exclude or deport noncitizens for “security and related
grounds.”2 A sublayer of this section is aimed at noncitizens who
engage in “any other criminal activity which endangers the public
safety or national security . . . .”3 The Executive Branch has
published regulations and policies that use national security
language in a similar manner. Federal courts have further upheld
immigration laws or deferred to Congress or agencies in the name
of national security.4 One tool that has enabled the cohabitation of
national security and immigration is the “plenary power doctrine,”
which originates from a case known as Chae Chan Ping v. United
States5 (alternately, the Chinese Exclusion Case) and refers to the
complete power “political branches” have over immigration.6 As
administrative and immigration law scholar Michael Kagan has
described, “[h]aving chosen an extra-constitutional foundation for
immigration law, the Court quickly came to the conclusion that the
judiciary had little or no role in reviewing decisions prohibiting
foreigners from entering the country . . . .”7 The practical impact is
that legal questions noncitizens raise regarding entry or rights in
the United States are limited. Indeed, when the plenary power
doctrine is invoked, the courts will not intervene.8
The outer limits of the plenary power doctrine have also been
tested in the courts and recently in connection with the Muslim
L.J. 669 (2007).
2. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182(a)(3), 1227(a)(4).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(A)(ii).
4. See, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604–05 (1889)
(noting Congress’ and the executive branch’s roles in conducting foreign
relations); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion
Cases: The Plenary Power Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10
ASIAN AM. L.J. 13, 15 (2003) (discussing doctrines of international law
enforcement in the U.S., including deference to Congress and the executive
branch).
5. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
6. Id. at 604–05 (1889) (explaining Congress’ and the executive’s power over
international affairs).
7. Michael Kagan, Plenary Power is Dead! Long Live Plenary Power!, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 21, 23 (2015).
8. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 604–608 (reflecting the
Court’s decision to not interfere in questions of international affairs); Saito, supra
note 4, at 15 (noting judiciary hesitation to interfere with the political branches’
power over national security).
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bans the Executive Branch has issued against noncitizens based
upon their nationality and religion.9 While it is simple to identify
the use of national security language by Congress, the executive
branch and courts, measuring the national security value of a
particular immigration law or policy is a greater challenge.
Moreover, when governments are permitted to create immigration
policies under a national security justification that is never tested,
or, even worse, found to be flawed, the human consequences are
grave. For example, the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service published a regulation known as “special registration” on
the heels of an announcement by then-Attorney General John
Ashcroft to track and interrogate certain individuals through a
“National Security Entry and Exit Registration System”
(“NSEERS”).10 With the NSEERS program, nearly 14,000 men
from primarily Muslim countries were placed in removal
(deportation) proceedings after coming forward to register with the
government.11 Former government officials responsible for
9. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (noting that the Judicial
Branch normally “must defer to the Executive and Legislative Branch” on
immigration, but Congress’ “plenary power” over creating immigration law is
“subject to important constitutional limitations.”); I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
941 (1983) (stating that Congress and the Executive must “cho[ose] a
constitutionally permissible means of implementing” their authority over
immigration). “These cases instruct that the political branches’ power over
immigration is not tantamount to a constitutional blank check, and that vigorous
judicial review is required when an immigration action’s constitutionality is in
question.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 590 (4th Cir.
2017); see also Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the
political branches’ powers in conducting foreign and national security affairs);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting the
judiciary’s deference to the political branches in matters of national security and
territorial sovereignty); Complaint, Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump,
No. 8:17-cd-02921-GJH (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2017), (alleging several times that the
executive order in question is impermissibly based on nationality and religion);
Zakzok v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-02969-GLR (D. Md. Oct. 6, 2017) (same); Exec.
Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (same); Exec. Order No.
13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (same).
10. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft
Announces Implementation of the First Phase of the National Security Entry-Exit
Registration System (Aug. 12, 2002) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
11. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, NSEERS or “Muslim” Registration Was a
Failed Post 9-11 Program and Must Come to an End, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2016),
https://medium.com/@shobawadhia/nseers-or-muslim-registration-was-a-failedpost-9-11-program-and-must-come-to-an-end-1200469bf64b (last visited Sept. 18,

1478

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1475 (2018)

administering the NSEERS program and national security experts
concluded that NSEERS was a huge waste of resources and
without national security benefit.12 Nonetheless, the fallout of the
program fell on the men who came forward and were later detained
and deported, as well as on their families.13 The use of national
security to create or defend immigration law or policy also raises a
number of constitutional concerns, some of which the courts have
addressed in connection with the plenary power doctrine and, more
recently, the appellate courts have addressed in reviewing the
Muslim bans in connection with the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.14
Beyond the Muslim Bans are increased use of existing tools
and the creation of new policies by the administration that
effectively operate to restrict certain nationals from entering the
United States or what I sometimes refer to as “backdoor bans.”15
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Ed Pilkington, Muslims
to March on White House in Bid to Dismantle Discriminatory Registry, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/12/americanmuslims-march-white-house-nseers (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. For a discussion of the opposition from domestic and foreign government
officials, including former General Counsel David Martin; former INS
Commissioner James Ziglar; former Commissioner of the Customs and Border
Protection agency at the Dept. of Homeland Security Robert Bonner; and Edward
Alden, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, see Shoba Sivaprasad
Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception,
114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1521–22 (2010) (discussing the Council on Foreign
Relations’, Government Accountability Office’s, and ex-government officials’ and
watchdogs’ view that the NSEERS program was without much benefit).
13. See id. at 1503–11 (discussing the impact that Post 9/11 policies had on
immigrant families); Wadhia, supra note 11 (providing a list of resources that
provide discussions of the individuals impacted by NSEERS); see also End the
Shame of NSEERS, AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., http://www.adc.org/
legal/end-the-shame-of-nseers/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the large
number of Arabs and Muslims ultimately deported for complying with the
NSEERS program without having been charged with terrorism) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
14. See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2017)
(discussing the likelihood of success of an Establishment Clause claim); Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 590 (4th Cir. 2017) (same).
15. See Sandra Bruno, U.S. Visa Applications: Extreme Vetting and the
221(g) Process, NAT’L L. REV. (May 18, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/u-s-visa-applications-extreme-vetting-and-221g-process (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) (discussing immigration policy requiring additional information,
documents, or background checks to determine visa eligibility beyond a typical
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President Trump coined the phrase “extreme vetting” at various
points of his tenure and also before he assumed office, but the term
has not been used consistently by the administration.16 The term
“extreme vetting” gained renewed attention following a terror
attack by a motorist in New York City that killed eight people and
injured several more; President Trump tweeted “I have just
ordered Homeland Security to step up our already Extreme
Vetting Program. Being politically correct is fine, but not for
this!”17 In an interview with FOX News, former Secretary of
Homeland Security John Kelly explained, “[e]xtreme vetting is, we
simply interview people and have to satisfy ourselves that the
person we’re talking to is indeed the person who they claim.”18
White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders outlined
extreme vetting as including extra collection and review of
biometric and biographical data; improved documentation
requirements and verification; heightened scrutiny and review by
Customs and Border Protection and related agencies; and
improved information sharing, among other items.19 On their face,
these measures are reasonable, but in reality the immigration
system has a number of screening procedures that use similar
consular interview) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
16. See, e.g., Joseph Tanfani, What Donald Trump Means When He Opposes
“Extreme Vetting” for Would-Be Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-extreme-vetting-20160816snap-htmlstory.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing Donald Trump’s use
of the phrase “extreme vetting” and explaining the extreme vetting proposal) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lauren Said-Moorhouse & Ryan
Browne, Donald Trump Wants “Extreme Vetting” of Immigrants. What Is the US
Doing Now?, CNN (Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/16/politics/howus-vets-immigrants-donald-trump-extreme-vetting/index.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 31, 2017, 6:26
PM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/925534445393928199?lang=en
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. Philip Rucker, Trump Says He Ordered U.S. to “Step Up Our Already
Extreme
Vetting
Program”,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
31,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/10/31/trump-sayshe-ordered-u-s-to-step-up-our-already-extreme-vetting
program/?utm_term=.e81f2cb80769 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. Blair Guild, What Is Extreme Vetting? White House Outlines Proposed
Immigration
Policy,
CBS
NEWS
(Nov.
1,
2017,
7:47
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-extreme-vetting/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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terms and involve similar government agencies. A Brennan Center
report looks comprehensively at the “extreme vetting” idea by
describing existing screening protocols as well as analyzing new
ones the Trump administration has announced.20 On February 6,
2018, President Trump established a “National Vetting Center”
responsible for “coordinat[ing] agency vetting efforts to identify
individuals who present a threat to national security, border
security, homeland security, or public safety.”21 While the details
of the center are less known, foreign nationals are already subject
to extreme vetting procedures when applying for visa for admission
to the United States.22 Similarly, “administrative processing”
pre-dates the Trump administration and has long been used to
hold visa applications following a visa interview at a consulate.
Administrative processing is sometimes known as Security
Advisory Opinion and is described in the following way in a fact
sheet the Penn State Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic
and the law firm of Maggio and Kattar produced:
Administrative processing takes place after the visa interview.
Before issuing a visa, consular officers review different
databases to determine if information exists that may impact
individual eligibility for a visa. A ‘hit’ on a particular database
occurs when there is a match between the visa applicant and a
database. These hits may be based on criminal convictions,
security risks, and prior visa overstays or denials (this list is
non-exhaustive). When an individual case has been tagged in a

20. See generally HARSHA PANDURANGA, FAIZA PATEL, & MICHAEL PRICE,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, EXTREME VETTING AND THE MUSLIM BAN (2017),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/extreme_vetting_f
ull_10.2_0.pdf (examining the Trump administration’s push for travel bans and
extreme vetting as stereotypical and discriminatory).
21. Donald J. Trump, Presidential Memorandum On Optimizing the Use of
Federal Government Information in Support of the National Vetting Enterprise,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidentialactions/presidential-memorandum-optimizing-use-federal-government-informationsupport-national-vetting-enterprise/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012)
(providing the grounds, including health, crime, security, need, and labor, which
are considered in determining eligibility for visas or admission); Foreign Affairs
Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://fam.state.gov/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(noting the eligibility and ineligibility criteria for obtaining a visa) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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database, the Department of State, at the request of the
consular post, may initiate administrative processing.23

These delays can go on for years and often without
explanation. More recently, select nationals subject to
administrative processing have stayed in this process or instead
have been rolled into the Muslim Ban 3.0.24
National security language has continued to guide the
creation and defense of Executive Orders and related immigration
policies issued in the Donald J. Trump administration. This Article
builds on earlier scholarship examining the relationship between
national security and immigration in the wake of September 11,
2001, under the Obama administration, and during the campaign
leading to the 2016 Election.25 While the Article is largely
descriptive, it ultimately questions the longevity of using national
security to create and defend immigration law. This Article is
limited in scope—it does not provide a deep dive into the
constitutionality of the Muslim bans, nor does it analyze the
literature about the future of plenary power. There is a large body
of scholarship and a treasure trove of litigation to address both
questions.26
23. MAGGIO+KATTAR & THE PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSING FAQS 1, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/
default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/Administrative-Processing-FAQ.pdf (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
24. See id. at 2–3 (discussing administrative processing timelines and
delays).
25. See generally, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Is Immigration Law
National Security Law?, 66 EMORY L.J. 669 (2017) (examining how recent national
security concerns have shaped immigration policy and comparing those against
policies enacted shortly after September 11, 2001); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia,
Business As Usual: Immigration and the National Security Exception, 114 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1485 (2010); Shirin Sinnar, Rule of Law Tropes in National Security,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1566, 1599 (2016) (noting unfairness in no-fly lists).
26. See generally Legal Challenges to Trump’s Entry Ban, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/category/cases-and-controversies/legal-challenges-totrumps-entry-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (listing numerous articles
providing analysis and coverage of the legal challenges to President Trump’s
entry ban) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Documents in State
of Hawaii et al v. Trump—A Challenge to President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Travel
Ban, HOGAN LOVELLS (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/
publications/documents-in-state-of-hawaii-et-al-v-trump-a-challenge-to-presidenttrumps-march-6-2017-travel-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing timelines
and briefs filed in Hawaii v. Trump) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Immigration in the Time of Trump, PENN STATE L. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’
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Part II of this Article describes the first three Muslim bans the
Executive Branch issued starting in January 2017.27 Part III
explains the legal challenges to those bans brought in federal
district and appellate courts around the country,28 and the
government’s reliance on national security language to justify the
bans. Part IV describes the human impact of the Muslim bans and
some responses outside of the courtroom by organizations who
represented the community and by the Penn State Law Center for
Immigrants’ Rights Clinic (CIRC). I launched the CIRC in 2008
which over the last decade has been engaged in providing legal
support in individual immigration cases, community outreach and
education and policy products for organizational clients.29
RTS. CLINIC, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/immigration-time-of-trump#Procs
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing web and other resources related to
immigration specifically tailored for use in preparation for the 2016 U.S.
presidential election) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gabriel.
J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction
for Our Strange but Exceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIG.
L.J. 257 (2000) (analyzing the plenary power doctrine and its future); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A Response to Is There a
Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289 (1999) (discussing the end of
the plenary power doctrine); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary
Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925
(1994) (analyzing the plenary power doctrine of the 1980s and providing a modern
examination of the doctrine); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) (arguing that the plenary power doctrine
as it relates to immigration law is in a slow decline); Stephen H. Legomsky,
Immigration Exceptionalism: Commentary on Is There a Plenary Power
Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 307 (1999) (discussing the apology and prediction
theses of plenary power).
27. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (restricting
immigration and entrance into the U.S. from specified countries for a 90-day
period); Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (rescinding
and supplementing portions of Executive Order 13,769); Proclamation No. 9645,
82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017) (adding countries to the restricted entry lists
under Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,870).
28. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554
(4th Cir. 2017); Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump,
265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017); Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241
F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017).
29. See Penn State Law Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic Provides
Outreach and Pro Bono Legal Support to Communities Across Pennsylvania,
PENN ST. U., http://www.psu.edu/feature/2017/10/12/building-communitythrough-compassion (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (describing the work of Penn
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II. Muslim Bans
For purposes of this Article, I use the term “Muslim ban” to
describe policies by the Executive Branch that prohibit nationals
from entering the United States. What to call the various bans the
President has signed since January 27, 2017,30 has itself emerged
as a question. Some prefer the term “travel ban” because it is more
neutral. Others prefer the term “Muslim” ban or “Muslim/Refugee”
ban because the restrictions imposed directly impact or block the
admission of nationals from countries with majority Muslim
populations or refugees. While I have used and continue to use
“travel ban” when describing the contents of these bans to the
general public or in written documents, I simultaneously believe
the term is inaccurate. The bans the President signed do not
merely restrict travel (e.g., a long weekend to Disneyworld) but in
fact prevent the ability for people to enter the United States period.
In my view, “Muslim ban” is an accurate description of the first
three bans the President signed; two as executive orders and one
as a presidential proclamation. In all three versions, the bulk of
nations targeted have Muslim populations of more than 90%, and
the bans have had devastating impacts on nationals from these
countries.
A. Muslim Ban 1.0
The first ban was issued as an Executive Order signed at
4:30 PM on January 27, 2017.31 The most controversial pieces of
the ban suspended the entry of foreign nationals from seven
countries—Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and
Syria—for a period of 90 days;32 suspended the United States’
State’s Center for Immigrants’ Rights Clinic) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017)
(establishing the first iteration of the various bans); Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82
Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (rescinding parts of and supplementing Executive
Order 13,769); Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017)
(adding countries to the restricted entry lists under Executive Orders 13,769 and
13,870).
31. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
32. Id. at 8977–78.
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refugee admissions program for a period of 120 days;33 slashed
refugee numbers by one half from 110,000 to 55,000;34 and
indefinitely suspended Syrian refugee admissions.35
Importantly, refugees are already screened by multiple federal
agencies and also interviewed by Department of Homeland
Security officials before their admission into the United States.
The government’s own website offers an infographic to describe the
screening process for refugees.36 In addition to being interviewed
by an officer of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS) for eligibility, the applicant’s background
information is checked against several federal agency databases,
followed by a cultural and medical check.37 The immigration
statute defines “refugee” as a person who has suffered persecution
or faces persecution in the future on account of their race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social
group.38 The refugee definition, coupled with the security checks in
place, underscores the rigor of the refugee admissions in the
United States.39
By its terms, the ban was effective immediately and, for this
reason, caused chaos in airports around the country, confusion
about the application of the ban to certain classes such as lawful
permanent residents,40 and long nights and days for lawyers.41
33. Id. at 8979–80.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See The Refugee Processing and Screening System, U.S. DEP’T ST. (Jan.
20, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/266459.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(providing an easy-to-read graphic of the refugee processing and screening
system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. Id.
38. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012)
(defining “refugee” under the INA).
39. See U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing
a comprehensive overview of the refugee admissions program) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Statement by
Secretary John Kelly on the Entry of Lawful Permanent Residents into the
United States (Jan. 29, 2017) (clarifying the national interest in permitting lawful
permanent residents to enter the country) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
41. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After
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Said Sirine Shebaya, a civil rights attorney for Muslim Advocates
who worked as an “airport lawyer” in the hours after the ban went
into effect, “We were trying to both help family members there,
draw attention to the chaos that was going on, and identify people
who needed legal assistance.”42 Attorneys also provided
on-the-ground support and education to impacted and interested
community members in the hours and days following the ban.43
The fallout of Muslim Ban 1.0 was not limited to the immediate
chaos, but also extended to the later discovery that the White
House had not consulted with its own attorneys before issuing the
ban.44
B. Muslim Ban 2.0
With the rescission of the first ban came the second, also in
the form of an Executive Order President Donald Trump signed on
March 6, 2017.45 This Executive Order suspended the entry of
Trump’s Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/
us/lawyers-trump-muslim-ban-immigration.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(noting that lawyers volunteered immediately to assist refugees entering the
country by meeting them at airports) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Lucy Westcott, Thousands of Lawyers Descend on U.S. Airports to Fight
Trump’s Immigrant Ban, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 29, 2017), http://www.newsweek.
com/lawyers-volunteer-us-airports-trump-ban-549830 (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. Esther Yu Hsi Lee, The Week the Country United Against Trump’s
Xenophobia, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/muslimban-one-year-anniversary-ce90b97d04da/?utm_source=NSHR+Rapid+Response&ut
m_campaign=2544c7dc3f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_19&utm_medium=email
&utm_term=0_3a915757be-2544c7dc3f-391821061 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Abed Ayoub & Khaled Beydoun, Executive Disorder: The
Muslim Ban, Emergency Advocacy, and the Fires Next Time, 22 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 215, 228–33 (2017) (examining the efforts of individuals responding to
President Trump’s Muslim Ban immediately after enactment).
44. See Evan Perez, Pamela Brown, & Kevin Liptak, Inside the Confusion of
the Trump Executive Order and Travel Ban, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/28/politics/donald-trump-travel-ban/index.html (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“Administration officials weren't immediately sure which
countries' citizens would be barred from entering the United States. The
Department of Homeland Security was left making a legal analysis on the order
after Trump signed it.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017)
(implementing revisions to the first Muslim Ban executive order).
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foreign nationals from six countries—Iran, Libya, Sudan, Somalia,
Yemen, and Syria—for a period of 90 days;46 froze the refugee
admissions program for a period of 120 days;47 and slashed the
refugee numbers by one half.48 There are at least three differences
between the first and second ban: in the second, the indefinite ban
on Syrians was dropped, the ban on Iraqi entrants was dropped,
and the effective date of the order was delayed for ten days. This
Executive Order also spelled out the exemptions with more clarity,
presumably because of the confusion generated in the aftermath of
the first ban. The exemptions listed in the second Executive Order
included: lawful permanent residents (green card holders); those
paroled or admitted into the United States; those permitted to
travel; dual nationals of a country traveling on a diplomatic visa;
and those granted refugee-related relief.49 Muslim Ban 2.0 also
introduced a new waiver scheme for those the ban covered, but who
can demonstrate that: (1) denying entry would cause the foreign
national undue hardship; (2) entry would not pose a threat to the
national security or public safety of the United States; and
(3) entry would be in the national interest.50 The terms “undue
hardship” “national security” and “national interest” were not
defined in the Executive Order nor are they defined specifically in
the immigration statute or regulations.51 The text of the Executive
Order listed ten examples of who might qualify for a waiver but
indicated that such waivers would be granted only on a case by
case basis.52 Some of these examples include foreign nationals with
significant work, study or other ties to the United States, those
seeking to enter the United States for business or professional
obligations, and those seeking to enter and reside with a close
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 13,201.
Id. at 13,210.
Id. at 13,216.
Id. at 13,213–14.
Id. at 13,214–15.
See id. § 3. See also SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA, PENN ST. L. CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RTS., UNTANGLING THE WAIVER SCHEME IN PROTECTING THE NATION
FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES 1–3 (2017),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/WaiverDocFinal%203.28.17.pdf
(discussing President Trump’s second Muslim Ban executive order’s waiver
scheme).
52. Exec. Order No. 13,870, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
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family member in the United States.53 On the same day the ban
was issued, lawyers and advocates rejected the ban and called it a
rebranded version of the first.54
C. Muslim Ban 3.0
A third version of the Muslim Ban was issued as a Presidential
Proclamation on September 24, 2017.55 A proclamation is similar
but not identical to an Executive Order in form.56 The proclamation
indefinitely blocks the entry for certain individuals from eight
countries: Iran, Libya, Chad, North Korea, Syria, Somalia,
Venezuela, and Yemen.57 These countries were ostensibly chosen
based on the perceived threat these countries posed.58 Sudan,
which had been listed as a banned country in the prior two Muslim
bans, was dropped from the list of banned countries in this third
version. The restrictions placed on nationals from the eight
countries in the third version are indefinite in duration. Like its
predecessor, Muslim Ban 3.0 includes exemptions for lawful
permanent residents, refugees, those granted asylum, and dual
nationals, among others.59 The ban also lists a waiver scheme and
examples similar to the language of the second version. The

53.
54.

Id. § 3(c).
See AM.’S VOICE EDUC. FUND, TRUMP’S “REVISED” REFUGEE AND MUSLIM
BAN
IS
STILL
A
REFUGEE
AND
MUSLIM
BAN
1–2
(2017),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/AVEF%20Press%20Release%20o
n%20Immigration%20EO.pdf (explaining that the President Trump’s second
Muslim Ban executive order was simply a slightly altered version of the first).
55. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (2017) (adding countries
to the restricted entry lists under Executive Orders 13,769 and 13,870).
56. See PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATIONS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1 (2017), https://pennstatelaw.
psu.edu/sites/default/files/Proclamations%20Memo%20Final.pdf (comparing and
contrasting presidential proclamations and executive orders).
57. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,163 (2017).
58. Id. § 1(h)(ii) (“[A]lthough immigrants generally receive more extensive
vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is less reliable when the country from
which someone seeks to emigrate . . . presents risks to the national security of the
United States.”).
59. Id. § 3(b) (providing a list of exceptions to restricted entry into the United
States).
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government provided no guidance about how the waiver will be
adjudicated, how often and by whom.60
III. Legal Challenges to the Bans
Each version of the ban was challenged in federal courts
around the country and by a variety of litigants that included
mosques,61 individual family members,62 states,63 and refugee
resettlement organizations,64 among others. A flurry of amicus
(friend of the court) briefs accompanied the first three Muslim
bans, and came from a wide range of interested parties who
include, but are not limited to, constitutional scholars,
immigration law professors, former national security officials,

60. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Supreme Court Issues Orders on Ban 3.0:
What You Need to Know, FACEBOOK (Dec. 12, 2017), https://
www.facebook.com/shoba.wadhia/videos/10211368742116442/?pnref=story (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining recent judicial orders concerning President
Trump’s Muslim Ban executive orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
61. See Associated Press, Travel Ban Challenge Puts Hawaii’s Few Muslims
in Spotlight, VOA (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.voanews.com/a/travel-banchallenge-puts-hawaiis-few-muslims-in-spotlight/3761158.html (Mar. 10, 2017)
(“Hawaii has 5,000 or so Muslims – less than 1 percent of the state’s
population – who are finding themselves thrust into an international spotlight
after the state’s top lawyer launched a challenge to President Donald Trump’s
revised travel ban . . . .”) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
62. See generally, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 2018) (providing an example of a lawsuit brought on behalf of individuals
by family members of refugees); see also Muslim Ban Litigation, BRENNAN CTR.
(Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/muslim-ban-litigationcase-page (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a summary background and
explanation of Zakzok) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See, e.g., Pete Williams, 15 States Join Hawaii’s Challenge to Travel Ban
Enforcement, NBC NEWS (Jul. 10, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/15-states-join-hawaii-s-challenge-travel-ban-enforcement-n781466
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining the states which decided to file lawsuits
challenging President Trump’s travel ban executive orders) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
64. See generally, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554
(4th Cir. 2017) (providing an example of a case brought by resettlement
organizations and other such groups).
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organizations who represent Muslim, Arab and South Asian
communities, and organizations who support the bans.65
The government advanced several arguments in defense of the
bans. As a preliminary argument, the government argued that the
courts have no right to review the terms of the ban. Citing to
Kleindienst v. Mandel,66 the government argued, “‘when the
Executive exercises’ immigration authority ‘on the basis of a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will [not] look
behind the exercise of that discretion.’”67 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals disagreed, concluding early on, “Although our
jurisprudence has long counseled deference to the political
branches on matters of immigration and national security, neither
the Supreme Court nor our court has ever held that courts lack the
authority to review executive action in those arenas for compliance
with the Constitution.”68 The government also identified section
1182(f) as a source of authority for excluding nationals from
countries. Section 1182(f) states in part:
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or of
any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental
to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation,
and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the
entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or
nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions
he may deem to be appropriate.69

With respect to Muslim Ban 1.0, attorneys began reviewing
possible legal claims for challenging Muslim Ban 1.0 and filed
documents in federal court seeking relief for individuals on an
expedited basis.70 One week after the first ban was announced, a
65. For a listing of these briefs, see A Rough Guide to Amicus Briefs in the
Travel Ban Cases, infra note 73 (providing a list of organizations which filed
amicus briefs in travel ban litigation).
66. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
67. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1162 (9th Cir. 2017).
68. Id.
69. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012).
70. For a listing of the nearly fifty legal challenges filed against Muslim Ban
1.0 in federal courts, see Special Collection: Civil Rights Challenges to Trump
Refugee/Visa Orders, U. MICH. L. SCH.’S C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?%20searchSpecialCollection=44 (last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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federal court judge from Seattle issued a nationwide injunction
that prevented the most controversial sections of the ban from
going into effect.71 Eventually, and presumably in reaction to a
heap of lawsuits filed around the country challenging its terms, the
ban was rescinded.72
While the litigation surrounding the first ban diminished with
the introduction of the second, lawsuits challenging the second and
third versions of the ban ensued over several months.73 The two
most important cases dealing with the Muslim Ban 2.0 originated
in the Hawaii and Maryland courts.74 Both courts issued
injunctions blocking the most controversial portions of the ban and
both injunctions were then appealed to the circuit courts of
appeals.75 The Government also asked the Supreme Court to
continue these bans and also hear arguments by filing a petition
for certiorari.76 On June 26, 2017 the Supreme Court granted a
partial stay (let a portion of Muslim Ban 2.0 go into effect) and also
granted certiorari in Muslim Ban 2.0.77 The June 26, 2017 decision
opened with a history of the travel ban and the constitutional and
statutory arguments made before the federal courts. The
71. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d at 1164–67, 1168–1169 (finding that
the federal government did not show a likelihood of success on the issue of due
process and failed to show that it was necessary to stay the order).
72. See Drew C. McCarthy, On Travel Order, Trump Will Rescind and
Replace,
NAT’L
REV.
(Feb.
16,
2017),
https://www.national
review.com/blog/corner/travel-order-trump-will-rescind-replace/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing President Trump’s plan to rescind the first Muslim
Ban executive order to replace it with a revised executive order) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. See A Rough Guide to Amicus Briefs In the Travel Ban Cases, TAKE CARE
(Apr. 24, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-rough-guide-to-amicus-briefs-inthe-travel-ban-cases (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (noting the many amicus briefs
filed in cases instituted in the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
74. See generally Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); Int’l
Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017).
75. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 701; Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857
F.3d at 604.
76. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-17168); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-1351).
77. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089
(2017) (“Accordingly, the petitions for certiorari are granted, and the stay
applications are granted in part.”).
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prevailing constitutional argument raised was that the travel ban
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.78 The
primary statutory argument surrounded whether the travel ban
violates a section of the Immigration and Nationality Act that
prohibits discrimination with regard to the issuance of immigrant
visas.79 Section 1152(a) of the Act states in part, “[N]o person shall
receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in
the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex,
nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”80
In allowing a part of Muslim Ban 2.0 to go into effect, the
Supreme Court determined that individuals from the six countries
(all of which have Muslim populations of more than 90%) and all
refugees can be blocked from entering the United States if they
lack a “bona fide” relationship to a person or organization.81 The
bona fide test was an invention of the Supreme Court and included
the following examples of what might constitute a “bona fide”
relationship:
For individuals, a close familial relationship is required. A
foreign national who wishes to enter the United States to live
with or visit a family member, like Doe’s wife or Dr. Elshikh’s
mother-in-law, clearly has such a relationship. As for entities,
the relationship must be formal, documented, and formed in the
ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading EO–2.
The students from the designated countries who have been
admitted to the University of Hawaii have such a relationship
with an American entity. So too would a worker who accepted
an offer of employment from an American company or a lecturer
invited to address an American audience.82

These examples did not resolve the confusion this decision
promised to cause to impacted individuals, employers, agencies,
consulates and other officials responsible for determining the term
“bona fide.” Even the dissent, arguing that the stay should have
been granted in its entirety, opined, “I fear that the Court’s remedy
78. See id. at 2084–86 (discussing the constitutional challenges in the lower
courts).
79. See id. (discussing the challenges to President Trump’s executive orders
for violating provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act).
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
81. See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. at 2088–89
(analyzing the Government’s request for a stay of injunction).
82. Id. at 2088.
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will prove unworkable. Today’s compromise will burden executive
officials with the task of deciding—on peril of contempt—whether
individuals from the six affected nations who wish to enter the
United States have a sufficient connection to a person or entity in
this country.”83
In its June 2017 opinion, the Supreme Court also overstated
the significance of the travel ban’s “waiver scheme” when it
reasoned, “Indeed, EO–2 itself distinguishes between foreign
nationals who have some connection to this country, and foreign
nationals who do not, by establishing a case-by-case waiver system
primarily for the benefit of individuals in the former category.”84
However, the waivers are more cumbersome than meets the eye
and only delay admission. The Supreme Court implemented the
order within seventy-two hours of the ruling.85 Hours before the
ban was to go into effect, the government issued guidance narrowly
defining what constitutes a “bona fide relationship:” “A ‘close
family’ relationship includes: a parent (including parent-in-law),
spouse, child, adult son or daughter, fiancé(e), son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, and sibling, whether whole or half. This includes
step relationships. However, ‘close family’ does not include
grandparents, grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews,
cousins, brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law and any other
‘extended’ family members.”86
The exclusion of grandparents and others from the bona fide
test struck a chord in the courts. Litigation about the meaning of
83. Id. at 2090.
84. Id. at 2088.
85. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2017)
(allowing portions of the district court’s order for an injunction to remain in
effect).
86. Frequently Asked Questions on Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC. (June 29, 2017),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/29/frequently-asked-questions-protectingnation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states-0 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(providing guidance to individuals regarding President Trump’s executive orders)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This guidance was later
superseded by another after the litigation. See generally Frequently Asked
Questions on Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United
States, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/29/
frequently-asked-questions-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states
(last updated July 21, 2017) (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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a “bona fide relationship” ensued in the Hawaii District Court and
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.87 On July 13, 2017, the Hawaii
District Court rejected the government’s narrow definition of bona
fide relationship and ruled that grandparents and other family
members cannot be excluded.88 Said the Hawaii court:
In sum, the Government’s definition of close familial
relationship is not only not compelled by the Supreme Court’s
June 26 decision, but contradicts it. Equally problematic, the
Government’s definition represents the antithesis of common
sense. Common sense, for instance, dictates that close family
members be defined to include grandparents. Indeed,
grandparents are the epitome of close family members. The
Government’s definition excludes them. That simply cannot
be.89

Among the jurisprudence the Supreme Court and the litigants
referenced was the well-known case of Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.90 There, the Supreme Court held:
[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural. Ours is by no means a tradition limited to
respect for the bonds uniting the members of the nuclear family.
The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and
children has roots equally venerable and equally deserving of
constitutional recognition.91

While the July 13 ruling by the Hawaii court was a win for
grandparents
and
common
sense,
the
government’s
(mis)understanding of family looms. Law aside, the debate around
“bona fide relationship” raises fundamental questions about
87. See Hawaii v. Trump, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1054–62 (D. Haw. 2017)
(addressing Plaintiffs’ challenge to the government’s interpretation of “bona fide
relationship”), aff’d, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017).
88. See id. at 1057–58 (“[T]he Government's utilization of the specific,
family-based visa provisions of the INA . . . constitutes cherry-picking and
resulted in a predetermined and unduly restrictive reading of ‘close familial
relationship.’”).
89. Id. at 1058.
90. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
91. Id. at 503–04.
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culture, identity, and family. Many define family in ways that go
beyond the nuclear one. Banning or restricting a grandparent or
aunt based on the absence of a “bona fide” relationship undermines
not only the jurisprudence around family but also the experiences
of first and second-generation immigrants living in the United
States. The sting of excluding family members like grandparents,
grandchildren, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins also sends
the message that such relationships are sham or unreal. But what
is truly unreal is the government’s narrow grasp of family.
Courtroom traffic proceeded over the scope of “bona fide”
relationship. On July 18, 2017, the Department of State issued an
announcement defining “close familial relationship” more
expansively.92 Meanwhile, the government filed papers in the
Supreme Court asking it to intervene again.93 The Supreme Court
scheduled oral arguments in connection with the second ban for
October 10, 2017, but these arguments were cancelled. Said the
Court, “[b]ecause that provision of the Order ‘expired by its own
terms’ on September 24, 2017, the appeal no longer presents a ‘live
case or controversy.’”94
Muslim Ban 3.0 was subject to legal actions in the federal
district courts of Hawaii and Maryland.95 Like litigation
92. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Muslim Ban Litigation: An Unfinished
Symphony, ACSBLOG (July 20, 2017), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/muslimban-litigation-an-unfinished
symphony?utm_content=bufferf728b&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter
.com&utm_campaign=buffer (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the
government’s response to the Hawaii District Court’s ruling on the definition of
“close familial relationship”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
see also Frequently Asked Questions on Protecting the Nation from Foreign
Terrorist Entry Into the United States (Updated July 21, 2017), U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND
SEC.,
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/29/frequently-askedquestions-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states (last updated
July 21, 2017) (last visited Oct. 2, 2018) (providing updated guidance to
individuals President Trump’s executive orders affected and the government’s
interpretation of bona fide and close familial relationships) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. Motion for Clarification of June 26, 2017, Stay Ruling and Application
for Temporary Administrative Stay of Modified Injunction, Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 377 (2017) (No. 16-1540) (requesting relief and intervention by the Supreme
Court).
94. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 353, 353 (2017).
95. For a listing of ongoing cases challenging the September 24, 2017,
executive order, see Litigation Documents & Resources Related to Trump
Executive Order on Immigration, LAWFARE, https://lawfareblog.com/litigation-
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surrounding earlier versions of the bans, plaintiffs argued that
Muslim Ban 3.0 is in violation of the immigration statute and also
the United States Constitution.96 The statutory arguments are
arguably stronger with regard to Muslim Ban 3.0 because of its
terms: the text indefinitely blocks the entry of all immigrants from
seven countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria,
and Yemen along with additional restrictions.97 By contrast, the
INA was amended in 1965 to eliminate the national origin and
nationality quotas and also included this new provision: “no person
shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against
in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race,
sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence.”98 In October
2017, the Hawaii and Maryland courts blocked the wholesale
suspension of nationals in Muslim Ban 3.0 on statutory grounds,
constitutional grounds or both.99 Once again, the Government
appealed the decisions to the appellate courts and furthermore
asked the United States Supreme Court to place a hold on the court
decisions pending a final disposition on appeal or at the Supreme
Court.100
The Supreme Court granted the Government’s wish and, on
December 4, 2017, allowed the full version of Muslim Ban 3.0 to go
into effect pending a decision by the appellate courts and
disposition of the Government’s petition for certiorari before the

documents-resources-related-trump-executive-order-immigration (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
96. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
66 – 70, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md.
2017) (No. TDC-17-0361); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at
26 – 30, Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md.
2017) (No. TDC-17-2921); Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 13–30, Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119
(D. Haw. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-00050-DKW-KSC).
97. See Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161, 45,165–67 (Sept. 24,
2017) (restricting entry into the U.S. from certain countries). The Proclamation
also includes restrictions for certain travelers from Venezuela. Id. at 45,166.
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012).
99. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md.
2017); Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Hawaii v.
Trump, 241 F.Supp.3d 1119 (D. Haw. 2017) (No. 17-00050 DKW KSC).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018)
(No. 17-965).
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Supreme Court.101 The decision was remarkable to the extent that
a broad ban was reinstated in full without a ruling by the appellate
courts and without specific guidance by the implementing agencies
about how the ban would apply in practice. Within twenty-four
hours of the December 4, 2017 decision, I started to receive calls
from students and scholars from an affected country about their
future, such as their ability to leave the United States and return
or the ability for a loved one to obtain a visitor visa to come visit
family in the United States. The timing of the Supreme Court’s
decision was surprising both procedurally and practically.
Procedurally, reinstating the ban on the Monday before the
appellate courts were scheduled to hear oral arguments on appeal
about the legality of the ban complicated a process that ordinarily
might start at a lower court, be raised at a higher court, and then
only considered by the Supreme Court. Practically, December is a
month during which students from around the world graduate
from university and when family members apply for visas or
schedule travel to depart or enter the United States to reunite with
family during the holidays. As a professor situated on a college
campus with one of the largest international student populations
and graduate studies programs, which had a fall semester
graduation date in the same month, my heart simply sank.
On December 6, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
heard oral arguments from the plaintiffs and government in the
Muslim Ban 3.0 case.102 The arguments focused largely on the
immigration statute, with an exchange between the judges and
counsel for the Plaintiffs about the scope and limitations of
statutory sections that pertain to nondiscrimination in the
issuance of immigrant visas103 and the authority by the President
101. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Ban 3.0 at the Supreme Court: What You
Need to Know, MEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2017), https://medium.com/@shobawadhia/
supreme-court-issues-orders-on-ban-3-0-what-this-means-db7c8e83c04c
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (explaining the relevant Muslim Ban cases, their results
in the courts, and who the results affected) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
102. See Hawaii v. Trump Oral Argument, C-SPAN (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?437732-1/ninth-circuit-hears-oral-argument-presidentstravel-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a video recording of oral
arguments in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hawaii v. Trump) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (addressing a policy of nondiscrimination in the
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to suspend the entry of noncitizens when such entry is
“detrimental to the interests” of the United States.104 On December
8, 2017, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments
on Muslim Ban 3.0, and in this round focused largely on the
constitutional questions, namely whether barring certain citizens
from six majority Muslim countries, plus North Korea and
Venezuela, violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.105
On December 22, 2017, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a decision that extended the Muslim Ban for nationals who
lack a bona fide relationship to a person or entity.106 Relying on the
statutory arguments, the court concluded “[t]he Proclamation, like
its predecessor executive orders, relies on the premise that the
INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., vests the President with broad powers
to regulate the entry of aliens. Those powers, however, are not
without limit. We conclude that the President’s issuance of the
Proclamation once again exceeds the scope of his delegated
authority.”107 Once again, the Ninth Circuit focused its conclusion
on the statute, finding that the Proclamation conflicts with the
nondiscrimination clause of the INA and furthermore fails to make
a finding that blocking nationals from the six Muslim majority
countries is “detrimental to the interest of the United States” as
Section 212(f) of the INA requires.108
On February 15, 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
issued a 285-page decision that was split among the judges.109 The
majority opinion focused on the likelihood that plaintiffs would
prevail on constitutional grounds and concluded that that the
Proclamation is “unconstitutionally tainted with animus toward
issuance of immigrant visas).
104. See id. § 1182(f) (authorizing the President to prohibit and restrict
certain classes of aliens, immigrants, or nonimmigrants from entering the U.S.).
105. See Listen to Oral Arguments, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIR.,
http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (providing audio recordings of arguments in the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
106. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017).
107. Id. at 673.
108. Id. at 673, 692–94.
109. See generally Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 2018).
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Islam.”110 The court’s conclusion did not rest on statements made
by the President before the election but rather on his subsequent
statements against Muslims. Said the court:
We need not [rely on pre-election statements] . . . because the
President’s inauguration did not herald a new day. Rather, only
a week after taking office, President Trump issued EO-1, which
banned the entry of citizens of six Muslim majority countries,
provided exemptions for Christians, and lacked any asserted
evidence indicating a genuine national security purpose. The
very next day, January 28, 2017, Rudy Giuliani, an advisor to
President Trump, explained that EO-1’s purpose was to
discriminate against Muslims.111

Prior to the decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
the administration filed a petition with the United States Supreme
Court asking it to hear the case.112 On January 19, 2018,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, Trump v. Hawaii, and
determine the legality of the ban.113 The Supreme Court asked the
parties to answer the following four questions: (1) whether the
challenge to EO-3 is justiciable;114 (2) whether EO-3 is a lawful
exercise of executive authority; (3) whether the global injunction
against EO-3 the Hawaii District Court entered and affirmed in
pertinent part by the Ninth Circuit is overbroad; and (4) whether
EO-3 violates the Establishment Clause.115 Several amicus briefs
were filed to the Supreme Court including but not limited to one
the author co-counseled. The amicus brief states, in part:
The third iteration of President Trump’s travel ban (EO-3)
dramatically exceeds the Executive’s authority under the
110. Id. at 257.
111. Id. at 266.
112. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018)
(No. 17-965).
113. Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No.
17-965).
114. For a comprehensive piece on judicial review and the travel bans, see
generally Peter Margulies, Bans, Borders, and Sovereignty: Judicial Review of
Immigration Law in the Trump Administration, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
115. See Grant of Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018)
(No. 17-965) (indicating which issues the Court wants discussed in the parties’
briefings). For the list of questions referred to in this Grant of Writ of Certiorari,
see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018)
(No. 17-965) (presenting the issues on appeal).
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It is irreconcilable with
the INA’s comprehensive framework and with past practice
under the statute. When Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) in
1952, it delegated to the President a cabined authority to enact
restrictions on immigration in response to exigent geopolitical
circumstances. It delegated this authority against a backdrop of
temporary, wartime grants, which the President was to use only
to restrict entry from hostile sovereign states and foreign
subversive groups. Congress was fully aware of this backdrop
when it passed § 1182(f). It did not intend to expand the
President’s peacetime powers beyond what his wartime
authority had been.116

On April 25, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
Trump v. Hawaii. During oral arguments, Solicitor General Noel
Francisco argued that the suspension clause or 212(f) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act gives the President authority to
add additional restrictions than what is outlined in the INA. On
behalf of Hawaii, Neal Katyal argued that the proclamation is
unlawful for three reasons: (1) it interferes with congressional
policy, (2) it conflicts with the nondiscrimination clause at Section
202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and (3) it violates
the First Amendment.117 On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court
issued a 5–4 decision upholding Muslim Ban 3.0. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the opinion and concluded that the proclamation
falls within the scope of Section 212(f) and further does not conflict
with the nondiscrimination clause at Section 202(a).118 Justice
Breyer’s dissent focused on the broken nature of the waiver scheme
in the proclamation and the position that the waiver process
amounts to “window dressing.”119 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent
116. See Brief for Scholars of Immigration Law in Support of Immigration
Law in Support of Respondents on the History of the Immigration and Nationality
Act as Amicus Curiae at 1, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 16-1540)
(providing a summary of the argument in support of Respondents).
117. Transcripts of Oral Argument at 38–39, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965). For an analysis of the oral argument, see Shoba
Sivaprasad Wadhia, Meditation on Oral Arguments in the Travel Ban Case,
ACSBLOG (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/meditation-on-oralarguments-in-the-travel-ban-case/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408–10 (2018) (addressing the
plaintiffs’ argument that the proclamation exceeded the President’s authority).
119. Id. at 2432–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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focused on the series of statements made by President Trump
against Muslims and the conclusion that proclamation is driven by
animus and in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.120
IV. Outside the Courtroom
The human impact of the Muslim Bans is more than
theoretical. The chaos at airports during the weekend of Muslim
Ban 1.0 was tied to the scores of individuals who were unable to
board planes to fly to the United States or unable to be admitted
after arrival because of their nationality. The press, immigration
attorneys and the policy groups documented these stories.121 One
publicized case involved Suha Abushamma, a Saudi in the first
year of an Internal Medicine residency program at Cleveland
Clinic. As ProPublica reported, Abushamma was born and raised
in Saudi Arabia and holds a passport from Sudan, which blocked
her admission to the United States. Said Abushamma, “I’m only in

120. See id at 2438–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Taking all the relevant
evidence together, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation
was driven primarily by anti-Muslim animus . . . .”). For an analysis of the
opinion, see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Symposium: Reflections on the travel ban
decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/
symposium-reflections-on-the-travel-ban-decision/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) and Supreme Court Term
Review, C-SPAN (June 28, 2018), https://www.c-span.org/video/?447684-1/legalexperts-discuss-major-supreme-court-decisions-2017 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. See Charles Ornstein, Hours After Landing in U.S., Cleveland Clinic
Doctor Forced to Leave by Trump’s Order, PROPUBLICA (Jan. 29, 2017),
https://www.propublica.org/article/cleveland-clinic-doctor-forced-to-leave-countryafter-trump-order (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (covering the story of a doctor
forced to return to Saudi Arabia in the confusion of President Trump’s executive
order) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Sam Fulwood III, The
Real Effect of Trump’s Muslim Ban, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/news/2017/02/09/414802/the-realeffect-of-trumps-muslim-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Lyric Lewin, These are the Faces of Trump’s
Ban, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2017/01/politics/immigration-banstories/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (showing photos and telling short stories of
the people President Trump’s executive orders have affected) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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this country to be a doctor, to work and to help
people—that’s it . . . .”122
With Muslim Ban 3.0 in full effect as of this writing, all
immigrants and certain nonimmigrants from five Muslim-majority
countries the ban targets are blocked from entering the United
States, regardless of whether they are in a qualifying relationship
with a family member or employer or if they are seeking to visit a
loved one as a visitor or tourist. I have personally witnessed the
separation of spouses from one continent to another and the
inability of a parent to visit a child who is a university student.
The feeling is heartbreaking. What is equally heartbreaking is the
broken nature of the waiver scheme first introduced in Muslim
Ban 2.0 and operational with the latest version 3.0. Several
applicants the Ban covers have been denied a visa by consulates
around the world with or without consideration of a waiver.123 The
waiver debacle has resulted in situation where consulates are
failing to consider evidence the applicant presents.124 To illustrate
the case of a Yemeni family in Djibouti separated from their family
in the United States:
A is a civil engineer and a United States Citizen who petitioned
for a visa for his wife, mother and children, ages 13, 9, and 5
years old, who are all Yemeni citizens. He accompanied them to
their interview at the Djibouti embassy in December 2017, at
the conclusion of which they were told everything was complete
and were even provided a document from the consular officer
that told them their visa had been approved, and that it was
awaiting printing. On December 14, however, A received a
second notice informing him that his family’s visas were all
denied and were furthermore considered ineligible for a waiver
under the Proclamation. He had not been contacted and had
asked for any additional information in between the two notices.
A has reached out to his congressional representatives, who—in
turn—have inquired with the congressional liaisons on his
122. Ornstein, supra note 121.
123. See Yeganeh Torbati & Mica Rosenberg, Exclusive: Visa Waivers Rarely
Granted Under Trump’s Latest U.S. Travel Ban—Data, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2018),
https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1GI2DU (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (“Attorneys representing applicants abroad who were turned down for visas
say consular officials have not clearly explained why their clients did not qualify
for waivers.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. See id. (“’There is a feeling of extreme frustration. People are operating
basically in the blind . . . .’”).
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behalf, seeking information as to why his wife and daughters
were denied a waiver. They were not provided with any reasons,
and were only told that the decision was final. A’s family
remains in Djibouti, unable to secure all the visas to Egypt and
afraid to return to Yemen, where he reports airstrikes have hit
approximately a thousand meters from their home.125

Resistance to the Muslim Bans outside of the courtroom has
also been significant, as community leaders, lawyers, law school
clinics, college and university presidents, affected individuals,
media outlets, and the court of public opinion played a tremendous
role in pushing back against the bans.126 For one example,
advocates working on behalf of the Yemeni community played a
central role in revealing the scores of individuals denied a visa,
125. PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. CLINIC, MUSLIM ADVOCATES,
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RTS., & ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING JUST., A VIEW
FROM THE GROUND: STORIES OF FAMILIES SEPARATED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL
PROCLAMATION 2 (2018), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/
pdfs/Immigrants/WaiverExamplesFinal.pdf.
126. See, e.g., Immigration in the Time of Trump, PENN ST. LAW CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. CLINIC, https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/immigration-time-oftrump#Procs%20and%20Eos (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a listing of
resources for immigrants to understand and navigate immigration issues after
the 2016 U.S. presidential election) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Alec Scott, “We Call it the Muslim Ban 3.0”: the Young Yale Lawyers
Fighting Trump’s Order, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2017/oct/23/dumbledore-army-donald-trump-travel-ban-legal-battlemike-wishnie (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing the group of young lawyers
working to combat President Trump’s executive orders) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Gregory Krieg, Opposition Groups Launch
Instant Backlash to New Travel Ban, CNN (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/06/politics/backlash-protest-trump-travelban/index. html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (discussing interest group work and
preparation in response to President Trump’s executive orders and predicted
future actions) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Scott Cohn,
Another Travel Ban In the U.S. is Igniting a Backlash, CNBC (Jul. 6, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/06/another-travel-ban-in-the-us-is-igniting-abacklash.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (examining state response and efforts
combatting President Trump’s executive orders and against other states that
have passed laws discriminating against certain groups of citizens) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); USA Today College Staff, How Universities
Are Responding to Trump’s Travel Ban, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2017),
http://college.usatoday.com/2017/01/29/how-universities-are-responding-totrumps-travel-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“The 62 institutions comprising
the Association of American Universities (AAU), released a statement . . . urging
government officials to end the travel ban ‘as quickly as possible.’”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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often without consideration of a waiver in the early days Muslim
Ban 3.0 was in effect and beyond.127
Further, advocates representing Muslim, Arab, and South
Asian (MASA) communities created a web platform with one
purpose: to “[c]enter communities directly affected by the Muslim
and refugee bans, namely Muslims, refugees, and nationals from
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen.”128 Deepa Iyer is
one of the coordinators for “nomuslimbanever.com” and MASA
Organizing, a rapid response and field coordination space that
emerged in the wake of the November 2016 election. Iyer told me,
The online hub provides an opportunity for organizations and
individuals to quickly locate direct actions, rallies, and
solidarity events as well as find resources about the Muslim ban
litigation. The website seeks to be a one-stop clearinghouse of
information for anyone interested in becoming engaged with
events and actions related to resisting the Muslim ban.129

Public education about the bans also surged. In response to
the bans, law school clinics and organizations representing
impacted communities also held community forums to explain
what the bans actually say and take questions from individuals.130
127. See Liz Robbins, ‘Your Visa is Approved,’ They Were Told. And Then It
Wasn’t., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/
nyregion/immigrants-visa-yemen.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“After the
third version of the Trump administration’s travel ban took effect on Dec. 8,
[Yemeni citizens’] approvals abruptly turned to rejections, in what lawyers,
family members and immigration activists said was a display of bad faith.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); The Yemeni American Justice
Initiative (YAJI), CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://ccrjustice.org/YAJI
(last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“The obstacles the Yemeni-American communities
face are manifold and complex, thus the approach taken by YAJI is similarly
multifaceted, combining legal tools with non-legal advocacy such as creating
resources, community outreach, and fact-finding projects.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. About the Campaign, NO MUSLIM BAN EVER, https://www.nomuslimban
ever.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
129. Email to Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia (March 6, 2018, 6:49 AM) (on file
with author).
130. See, e.g., Town Hall on the Travel Ban, PENN ST. L. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’
RTS.
CLINIC
(Sept.
29,
2017),
https://www.facebook.com/PennState
Law/videos/10155427433862481/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (providing a video
recording of a question and answer discussion about President Trump’s executive
orders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Challenging the
Refugee and Muslim Ban, YALE L. SCH. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/yls-
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As part of one of the most impacted universities,131 I delivered
numerous information sessions and town halls on the Muslim bans
and fielded hundreds of questions from individuals in my
individual capacity or as part of the immigration clinic at Penn
State Law. The questions focused largely on the details of the bans
and how they impact travel and the future.132 Together or separate
from the clinic, key organizations like the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee,133 Arab American Institute,134
Bridges Initiative,135 Muslim Advocates,136 and National
Immigration Law Center137 organized conference calls, convened
public forums, and developed written fact sheets or updates about
the Muslim bans.138
today/news/challenging-refugee-and-muslim-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(discussing law school involvement in quickly responding to the executive orders
preventing immigrant entry into the U.S.) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
131. See, e.g., The 10 US Colleges that Stand to Lose the Most from Trump’s
Immigration
Ban,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Feb.
1,
2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/colleges-potentially-most-affected-trump-immi
gration-ban-2017-2 (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (listing the ten colleges and
universities at risk of losing the greatest number of individual students because
of the temporary travel ban) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Gabriela Stevenson, Penn State Has the Fourth Highest Number of Students
Impacted by the Immigration Ban, ONWARD ST. (Feb. 2, 2017),
https://onwardstate.com/2017/02/02/penn-state-has-the-fourth-highest-numberof-students-impacted-by-the-immigration-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(noting the high number of individuals the immigration ban affected at Penn
State University) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. See Town Hall on the Travel Ban, supra note 130; Immigration After the
ST.
L.
CTR.
FOR
IMMIGRANTS’
RTS.
CLINIC,
Election,
PENN
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/immigration-after-election#Procs (last visited Sept.
18, 2018) (providing web and other resources related to immigration specifically
tailored for use in preparation for the 2016 U.S. presidential election) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
133. ARAB-AM. ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., http://www.adc.org/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. ARAB AM. INST., http://www.aaiusa.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
135. BRIDGE INITIATIVE, http://bridge.georgetown.edu/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. MUSLIM ADVOCATES, https://www.muslimadvocates.org/ (last visited
Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
137. NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR, https://www.nilc.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. See The Trump Immigration Executive Orders: Impact on Arab and
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One year following Muslim Ban 1.0, on January 27, 2018,
hundreds gathered in Washington D.C. to mark the anniversary.139
Said Congresswoman Judy Chu, Chair of the Congressional Asian
Pacific American Caucus, in a joint statement:
One year ago, President Trump enacted the first iteration of his
discriminatory Muslim travel ban in order to fulfill a campaign
promise rooted in hatred and xenophobia. This policy will
always be remembered for its blatant bigotry and the chaos it
caused in our nation’s airports on the day it was hastily
unveiled. But it will also be remembered as a day when
thousands of Americans across the country came together to
denounce hate.140
Muslim Communities, PENN ST. L. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RTS. CLINIC,
AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, & MUSLIM ADVOCATES (Sept.
29, 2017), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/events/trump-immigration-executiveorders-impact- arab-and-muslim-communities (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(announcing an event to be held to discuss President Trump’s executive orders
and the related litigation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC, AMERICAN-ARAB
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, TRAVEL BAN RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT:
WHAT STUDENTS NEED TO KNOW (2017), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/
sites/default/files/pictures/faculty/ADC%20PSU%20Student%206.28.17.pdf
(explaining what the travel ban is, how courts have already ruled on the executive
orders at issue, and providing guidance to those students the executive orders
may have affected); PENN STATE LAW CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS CLINIC,
AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE, SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER PROTECTING THE NATION FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST ENTRY
INTO THE UNITED STATES OR “REFUGEE/MUSLIM BAN 2.0” (2017),
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/MuslimBan2%200ADCPSU_Fi
nal_0.pdf (providing an easy to read summary of President Trump’s executive
order).
139. See Alejandro Alvarez, On the Year Anniversary of the Muslim Ban,
Protesters Take to the White House, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 27, 2018),
https://thinkprogress.org/muslim-ban-year-anniversary-7f2a0b61b6b0/
(last
visited Sept. 18, 2018) (covering the continued resistance against President
Trump’s executive orders a year later) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Omar Suleiman, One Year After the Travel Ban, I Am Not Your American
Muslim, CNN (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/opinions/travelban-anniversary-suleiman-opinion/index.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2018)
(discussing the immigration ban and those affected one year after the first
executive order and its effect on Muslim-Americans specifically) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
140. CAPAC Members on One Year Anniversary of Trump’s Muslim and
Refugee Travel Ban, CONG. ASIAN PAC. AM. CAUCUS (Jan. 26, 2018), https://capacchu.house.gov/press-release/capac-members-one-year-anniversary-trump%E
2%80%99s-muslim-and-refugee-travel-ban (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Said the national organization South Asian Americans
Leading Together:
No one should fear for their safety because of their country of
origin, how they pray, speak, or dress. Yet that is exactly what
this administration attempted to accomplish one year ago today
when it signed into the law its first Muslim Ban. Over the year,
through a combination of hateful rhetoric, toxic tweets, and
polluted policies, including four iterations of the Muslim Ban,
this administration has made every effort to institutionalize
Islamophobia.141

Resistance and public education outside the courtroom serve
as an important reminder that whatever may happen in the courts,
there has been success in how groups and communities have been
responding. Those involved will not forget the thousands of
lawyers who descended to the airports the night of the first ban or
the scores of advocates who have and continue to inform and
educate the communities about the various iterations of the bans
and best practices for moving forward, especially for—but not
limited to—those who the ban covers and are seeking a waiver.
V. Conclusion
For more than two centuries, national security has been used
to justify immigration laws that exclude people based on race and
related factors. Even in cases where the courts or a future
administration have struck down these laws or found no connection
between matters of national security and the basis for exclusion,
there has been little to no government accountability. As I reflect on
the profound human impact, prolonged courtroom sessions and
resistance to the Muslim bans, my hope is that the government is
held accountable with restitution to those impacted and a stronger
country.

141. One Year of the Muslim Ban. One Year of Resistance., S. ASIAN AMS.
LEADING TOGETHER (Jan. 26, 2018), http://saalt.org/saalt-statement-on-one-yearanniversary-of-the-muslim-ban/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).

